This paper examines the impact that the current taxation and expenditure structure in Canada has on individuals' incentives to invest in different fields of study at the university level. Effective tax rates and effective subsidy rates by field of study are calculated. Findings show that ETRs are quite uniform across different fields. The range of female ETRs is lower, than males, while their rates of return higher. When the expenditure side is taken into account, there is substantial encouragement in all fields to invest in human capital at the university level. Fields with a laboratory component are treated far more favorably. The paper also examines the impact that deregulation of tuition fees has had on individual incentives to invest in certain programs. To this end we concentrate on three of the top business schools in Canada in an attempt to determine what deregulation has meant for business students. The effect is that rates of return are unambiguously lower and income premiums range between 16 -39%.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it is intended to show the impact that the current tax structure in Canada has on individuals' incentives to invest in different fields of study at the university level. To do this effective tax rates (ETRs) and effective subsidy rates (ESRs) by field of study are calculated. Second, it is to examine the impact that deregulation of tuition fees in particular disciplines or programs has on individuals' incentives to invest. To this end we concentrate on three of the top business schools in Canada. this policy had the intended impact it was designed to have? That is, has it been able to lower or maintain enrolment in order to keep class sizes down? Are people who are admitted to these disciplines "better off" in the long run then they otherwise would be? What is the impact of higher tuition on males and females? Are both impacted equally or is one sex more adversely affected than the other?
Effective tax rates are the proportional difference in before and after-tax rates of return.
While they have been used to study investment behavior in all kinds of physical capital, the use of ETRs to study investment decisions in human capital has only recently begun to take shape (see Collins and Davies, 2003) . This is somewhat surprising due to the overall impact that human capital investment has on the economy. Both the externalities arising from the accumulation of human capital and its impact on growth and innovation have been studied extensively (see, for example, Davies, 2002; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995) . While the framework developed in this paper is used to examine the incentive effects of investing in a university education for different fields of study, there is a wide range of possible extensions. We discuss some of the more pressing issues later in the paper.
While previous studies have shown the impact of the tax structure on individuals' incentives to invest in a university education nationwide (see, e.g., Collins and Davies, 2003) , none have disaggregated by field of study. By disaggregating we can get a sense of how different fields are treated. Individuals in different fields earn at different levels. Given the graduated rate structure on income this means that certain fields of study will be treated differently. Likewise, different fields charge different tuition and fees. Similarly, some fields are harder to get into then others. Therefore, students in particular disciplines may be of higher quality or ability. If people in particular fields are more able than others, then the earnings premium in different fields may be partly the result of ability; the degree may act as a signal to employers. If "higher quality" disciplines (like top ranked versus lower ranked business schools) act as better signals, then even higher earnings premiums may result. If true, then this may offset the recent trend of some schools that are charging high tuition.
Like their physical capital counterpart, ETRs on human capital are nonuniform. Findings here show that they vary depending on whether the student is male or female and what discipline they are in. As with past studies, female rates of return are found to be greater than males. This is a result of the larger earnings increment that exists between female high school and university graduates. Males face higher ETRs than females, due to higher marginal tax rates on income.
Female ETRs average 11.7%, while males average 13.4%. When the expenditure side is taken into account and the net effect of both taxation and expenditures calculated, the findings support an education system that promotes investment in all major fields of study at the university level, with the largest support going to the health related disciplines. The least support is to social science and commerce fields, which may explain why many business schools lobbied for the deregulation of fees in Ontario in the late 1990's.
In 1998 in Ontario the Tories permitted some programs at Ontario Universities to deregulate their tuition fees. As a result, certain disciplines (e.g. Engineering, Computer Science, and Business) are now charging tuition that is far higher than that faced by the average university student. Previous studies have shown the impact that increasing tuition has on rates of returns (see, for example, Vallaincourt and Bourdeau-Primeau, 2002) . These studies find that despite large, hypothetical increases in tuition, investing in a university degree remains an attractive option for many students, given the high rates of return. While interesting, little of the work has taken into account the impact of the tax structure on these disciplines in conjunction with the added tuition hike. Fields that were once high return fields may not be so as a result of deregulation. The findings here support this latter view. For instance, students at one of the top three business schools in Canada would have to make an earnings premium of between 16 -39%, depending upon whether they were male or female and what school they attended, in order to have the same rate of return as prior to deregulation. In other words, these students would have to make 16 -39% more than the average business graduate if they wanted to get the same rate of return on their degree as they had before the rise in tuition levels. With no such increase, the rate of return to an undergraduate business degree would dominate only that of a humanities degree.
An additional dilemma for Canadian policymakers is that the profitability of obtaining a university degree in Canada increases dramatically if students choose to migrate to the United States after they graduate (See Collins, 2003) . We show that education policy, combined with tax structure, may be a contributing factor to the brain drain phenomenon witnessed in Canada.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the methodology used to calculate rates of return and effective tax/subsidy rates; Section 3 looks at the impacts that taxation has on individual incentives to invest in different fields, while Section 4 looks at the field of business and assesses the impact that deregulation of fees has had on students; Section 5 provides some policy perspective; Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
METHODOLOGY

Background
A number of studies have looked at the returns to education and tuition policy in Canada (see, for instance, Rathje and Emery, 2002; Vallaincourt and Bourdeau-Primeau, 2002) . While interesting, there has been no account of the impact of the tax and expenditure systems on individual incentives to invest in a university education. Many of these studies look solely at rates of return, public (or social) and private. The issue here is that returns tell only part of the story. It is the intent of this paper to extend the previous analyses in an attempt to provide a more comprehensive look at higher education in Canada. To this end we examine both the taxation and expenditure systems in conjunction with one another. This permits a better overall picture of education policy as it pertains to university students, since it allows us to note the impact tuition hikes have on the university education system as a whole. To accomplish this, we calculate effective tax rates (ETRs) and effective subsidy rates (ESRs). The difference will provide an overall assessment of tax and expenditure effects on the incentives to take higher education in Canada.
While effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) have been used to study a wide range of investment opportunities in physical capital, the study of ETRs on human capital has only recently begun to take shape (see, e.g., Collins and Davies, forthcoming; Collins, 2003; and Mintz, 2001) . The distinction between the calculation of EMTRs for physical capital and ETRs for human capital is that the lumpiness of human capital investments tends to matter, unlike for physical capital, as explained below. Therefore, we are not necessarily measuring the marginal investment in human capital per se, but rather the next level of the investment. For instance, the move from middle school to high school or from secondary schooling to post-secondary education.
While the problem of measuring effective tax rates on human capital is formally the same as that for physical capital, there are measurement issues that make a different approach necessary in practice.
ii In the case of physical capital one can make plausible assumptions about the rate of return to a hypothetical marginal investment based on observed asset returns in capital markets. For human capital rates of return are not directly observable. For physical capital the fact that real-world investments are typically lumpy does not affect the results. Corporate taxes are levied at a flat rate, so the estimated effective tax rate does not depend on the size of the investment. For human capital the most important tax is the personal income tax, whose graduated rate structure makes the effective tax rate depend on the scale of the investment.
In the past, changes in tuition have been examined for their impact on rates of return. If the rates of return remain higher than the next best alternative, previous studies, like those mentioned above, assume that the increase can be justified. The methodology employed here allows for a more detailed interpretation of the deregulation of tuition fees. Rather than look at hypothetical increases across all disciplines, we examine the actual results post-deregulation. Our assessment of the overall impact on the education system is based on rates of return, to provide a point of comparison with past studies, ETRs and ESRs.
Regression Equation, ETR and ESR Calculation
We examine six undergraduate fields: Humanities, Social Sciences, Commerce, Natural Sciences, Engineering, and Health Sciences. A description of each field is provided in Table 1 .
[Insert 
to compute earnings over the lifecycle. To calculate our counterfactual we use the relationship between age and age squared to compute high school earnings and the entire equation to compute earnings by field of study. The difference between these two is the earnings increment.
We calculate this for each field and for each age. The findings are then used to compute internal rates of return and ultimately ETRs and ESRs by field of study. VB's data on tuition, fees and public expenditures are also used for the calculation of our counterfactual (i.e. before deregulation).
iv Suppose that an individual aged t is planning to engage in a program of education that will take m years of study. We will assume that after this program is completed the individual will stay in the labor force until age T. Students may continue to earn while going to school. By replacing gross-of-tax variables in (1) with after-tax variables the net after-tax rate of return, r n , may be computed.
The ETR for human capital is simply defined as the proportional difference between gross-and net-of-tax rates of return to a program of study:
This definition, which is built on the use of internal rates of return, follows the methodology applied in computing ETRs on personal financial assets by Davies and Glenday (1990 Whether the tax and expenditure systems combined have an incentive or disincentive effect on human capital investment can be investigated by computing the net effective tax rate on human capital, ETR -ESR. Through the use of these three equations, we are able to get an overall picture of the incentives to invest in different fields of study, as well as the impact of deregulation. Tables 2 through 4 illustrate the overall impact of Canada's education system on individuals incentive to invest in a university education. In Table 2 we see that female rates of return are higher than male in all disciplines, except for engineering. The male/female wage gap is sufficiently large in engineering to make the rate of return lower for women. While the Female/Male ratio has been rising over the last number of years at universities, when broken down by field, men still predominantly choose engineering; historically, this has also been the case. The result is that males predominantly hold many of the high paying senior positions.
TAX IMPACTS ON INCENTIVES TO INVEST
Therefore, the earnings increment for men, that is the difference between high school earnings and university earnings, is greater. Large enough, in fact, to override the disincentives created by the higher marginal tax bracket male earners find themselves in.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The opposite can be seen in health science. Historically, women have tended to hold these positions and, as such, are in the higher paying jobs; this results in a higher earnings increment and an increase in rates of return. Once again, the disincentives created by the progressive income tax system are not enough to offset the income differential between health professionals and high school graduates.
More importantly, Table 2 shows that effective tax rates do not vary greatly across disciplines. This is particularly interesting since each field has different earnings potential. For instance, commerce and engineering graduates tend to have higher paying jobs, on average, then, say, humanities or social science graduates. This would tend to push individuals in these fields into higher tax brackets due to the graduated rate structure on income. Surprisingly, the higher rate of taxation, combined with the higher tuition business and engineering students face, is not enough to cause the ETRs to be exceedingly higher.
vi Males face higher ETRs in all disciplines, than females; as a result, they face greater taxside disincentives to invest in a university education. The disincentive is so large that it actually increases the financial incentive for men to seek alternative job opportunities in the United
States. As seen in Collins (2003) , university graduates have large tax-side incentives to extend their job search to the United States. Not only is this due to the larger earnings potential, but also the more liberal tax treatment on labor income. The U.S. system is flatter (i.e. less progressive, with more liberal itemized deductions) than the Canadian. Given this, net rates of return are depressed greater in Canada. The result is a larger gap between net and gross rates of return and higher ETRs. How this contributes to the brain drain in Canada is something that deserves further exploration.
Of course, the tax system is only half of the education puzzle; there is also the expenditure side. The education system in Canada is heavily funded and this is illustrated in Table 3 . Public rates of return, which are those that take into account public funding per full time equivalent student, are remarkably lower than gross or net private rates. This leads to exceptionally high effective subsidy rates (ESRs) for all fields.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
An interesting result is that unlike the ETRs, the ESRs are highly nonuniform. Those disciplines which require labs and research facilities, such as engineering and health programs, receive disproportionate funding, compared to those that do not, such as the social sciences and commerce. This imbalance is one element in the argument that deregulation of tuition fees in certain fields, such as commerce, is needed. Deregulation counteracts the funding formula of the government, in terms of the amount that can be spent per student, by replacing the missing public contribution in under funded areas by private contributions. Another reason for deregulation, which we will have more to say about later, is the higher expenditure on professors' salaries in certain fields, like business administration. Higher salaries are required, in part, to compensate for higher market value of professors. Without deregulation, universities argue that students suffer due to retention and recruiting problems of high quality professors.
Another interesting result in Table 3 is the greater subsidy rate for females as opposed to males. Combined with lower ETRs and higher rates of return, this may account, in part, for female/male ratios rising over the past number of years. The largest difference between male and female subsidies is in the engineering field -a field that is predominantly male. The higher subsidy per full time equivalent female counteracts this latter fact by increasing the incentives for females to choose engineering. Whether by design or by accident, this policy seems to have positive repercussions.
To get a full picture of the education system in Canada we calculate the net ETR, which takes both the subsidy rate and rate of taxation into account. These results are presented in Table   4 . Not surprisingly, given our previous findings, the net ETRs are nonuniform. The ESR overrides the ETR, leading to negative net ETRs. The result is that the Canadian education system tends to promote investment in university for all fields. The fields that face the highest overall incentives are the ones that receive the highest funding from the government (engineering, pure sciences, and health).
[Insert Table 4 Here]
The results bring up some interesting policy issues. While it is true that some disciplines require more money to conduct labs and run research facilities, these fields are often the higher return fields. Witness the fact that both males and females have their highest returns from the engineering and health related fields, respectively. Without commerce, the three fields with high costs for labs and research facilities would rank 1-2-3 for both males and females. Given the return on their investment, it would seem that these students are in a position to incur additional direct costs to education and still receive a rate of return above and beyond many other disciplines. Does this justify deregulation?
One problem with the above argument is that, as mentioned, these fields already receive a disproportionate amount of government funding. Allowing them to deregulate fees, without changing the funding formula, would seem to be benefiting the "rich" programs (highly funded fields) at the expense of the "poor" programs. Then there is the issue of enrolment and job opportunities.
Engineering graduates, for instance, typically earn more than, humanities graduates. Does that make them more valuable? In terms of market value, the response would seem to be yes. One dilemma is that health related disciplines also have high rates of external benefits.
From Table 3 , we see that the health field also receives the highest amount of subsidization. Few would argue that this latter fact isn't justified by the former. Engineering, on the other hand, while contributing to growth and innovation, does not have the same external benefits (Rathje and Ember, 2002) . vii Of course, we are talking about the undergraduate level. At the graduate level, external benefits of engineering, like many other disciplines, rise. Does this justify the increased funding? Unfortunately, an answer to this question is beyond the scope of this analysis, but nonetheless, would prove fruitful for further study.
DEREGULATION OF FEES: INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The Case for Ontario
In 1998 in Ontario the provincial government permitted some programs (e.g. engineering, computer science, commerce, etc.) at Ontario Universities to deregulate their tuition fees; as a result, certain disciplines are now charging tuition that is far higher than that faced by the average university student. Studies have shown that increasing tuition, while having a negative impact on returns, would still not make other means of investing more attractive (see, for instance, Stager, 1994; Rathje and Emery, 2002) . These previous studies have not taken into account the impact of the tax structure on these disciplines, let alone in conjunction with the added tuition hike. More to the point, fields that were once high return fields may not be so as a result of deregulation, which raises the question of why so many students continue to enroll in these programs.
Proponents of deregulation argue that increasing tuition fees in certain disciplines is necessary to maintain class size and quality of education. Provincial funding cuts in the 1990's also made finding other sources of revenue a priority for certain fields; namely, the fields where market value of professors is high. In this section we address deregulation five years after its inauguration in an attempt to determine if it has had its intended effects. The increase in enrollment comes even as tuition and fees in these programs continue to rise. Of course, the rise in enrollment may not spell the end of manageable classroom sizes. It could be that more sections of the same course are now offered. Higher tuition fees may also permit the hiring of more professors. Therefore, to draw any conclusion about deregulation based on enrollment numbers alone would be unjustified.
Unfortunately, the data do not support the latter view. 
An Examination of Three Top Canadian Business Schools
We now turn our attention to the case of Canada's top three business schools: Queen's School of Business (Queen's University), The Richard Ivey Business School (University of Western Ontario), and The Rotman School of Management (University of Toronto). Tuition in the deregulated fields is roughly 200% greater for students admitted to a 4-year honors program in business, than the tuition fees that the majority of students are facing. This can mean tuition in excess of $15,000 for one year of education. Does the selective nature of these programs ensure a return high enough to offset these high tuition fees? To this end, what type of "income premium" is required to return the rate of return to its pre-deregulation value? Finally, given deregulation, does it pay for students to invest in a business degree over other fields? We address these questions below.
Our selection of these three business schools is based on rankings in magazines such as Business Week and the Financial Times. As Table 6 shows, these universities are in the top echelon in Canada. On the international front, a recent survey by Business Week places Queen's 2 nd among international business schools (i.e. business schools outside of the U.S.), while
Western ranked 6 th and Toronto 5 th . It should be pointed out that while researchers are currently studying the importance of such rankings in the selection process of students, we make no such claim. Our selection is simply based on the fact that these three schools rank the highest for the field of business in Canada in recent surveys. Whether or not students are of better quality, or the rankings lead more able students to choose these schools is left for future research. Using the latest information on tuition and fees, Table 7 shows estimated net rates of return for students in these business schools. The high tuition fees result in a drastic reduction in rates of return for all students. The drop is so large that all other fields, except humanities, strictly dominate a business degree from these three schools. That is, all fields of study, besides humanities, yield higher rates of return than does a business degrees from any of the three top business schools.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
The rates of return are calculated using mean earnings of all 4-year business degree graduates. Some would argue that this logic is flawed, since higher quality business schools typically have better students; as a result, this may lead to greater possibilities after graduation and higher salaries. With this in mind, we calculate a quality premium, which is the loss in rates of return as a result of going to these schools, as well as an income premium. The income premium is based on a required increase in mean earnings of top business school graduates, such that their rates of return are returned to their original levels (i.e. pre-deregulation numbers).
The quality premium is calculated by taking the difference between the pre-and postderegulation rates of return for business school students. The quality premium for females is higher than it is for males. Higher tuition and fees have a greater impact on female rates of return, than on males (Collins, 2003) . While the quality premium has a negative impact, one cannot discount the possibility of increased earnings as a result of attending one of these three schools. Therefore, students may in fact be better off, even in the face of exceedingly high tuition.
Of the three schools in our study students at the University of Western Ontario, the school with the highest tuition and arguably the school with the best reputation among business schools, must have the highest income premium if they are to realize an overall monetary benefit. The income premium for these students is 39% for females and 23% for males. Students at business schools at Queen's and Toronto face roughly the same income premium of 28% for females and 16% for males. Are these increases in income likely? If students at these schools are the "cream of the crop" then their income after graduation may indeed be higher. The question then arises, how much of this increase is due to ability and/or how much of it is the "signal"
provided by their place of study? If it is simply ability, then these students would be better off studying business at a different school. It if is the signal, then, providing the income premium is large enough, deregulation would appear to be justified from an equity standpoint. Whether or not deregulation can be justified from an efficiency standpoint would be an interesting question for further research.
While it is interesting to discuss income premiums and examine changes in rates of return due to increased tuition, the real benefit of the methodology laid out in the beginning of this paper is the fact that we can study the taxation and expenditure implications of such an increase.
In Table 8 we see a reduction in gross rates of return, as well as net rates of return for all students at these three business schools. The proportional difference between gross and net rates of return is also increased due to the impact that an increase in tuition has on net rates of return (Collins and Davies, forthcoming) . The result is a larger effective tax rate for males and females, compared to our base case. Therefore, not only are these students facing much higher tuition than that of the average student, they are also subjected to greater disincentives on the tax side to invest in the education in the first place.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
On the expenditure side, the increase in tuition has resulted in a reduction in the subsidy rate per full time equivalent student. The rise in ETR and fall in ESR, increases the disincentives for students to invest in a business degree; this is seen through an increase in net ETRs. The changes also lead to greater incentives for students to seek employment elsewhere upon graduation.
With a more progressive income tax system in Canada than the U.S., graduates are somewhat at a disadvantage when compared with their American counterparts. Often higher paying jobs in the United States are to blame for graduates leaving the country, but as we see here the tax system may also be to blame. Even in the face of purchasing power parity, students in Canada would still find it worthwhile to move to the U.S. (Collins, 2003) . Not only is there a more mildly progressive income tax, but many other tax breaks also exist, making the U.S. a very attractive destination for many graduates.
EDUCATION POLICY IN CANADA
In the face of rising costs to education, tuition deregulation, double cohorts, rising participation rates, recruiting and retention problems of quality professors, the post secondary education system in Canada seems to be in a state of perpetual flux these days. In this section we address some of the issues in more detail and offer some guidelines for dealing with them.
With rising costs to higher education in Canada more people have started to take advantage of registered education savings plans (RESPs). RESPs allow people to save for their children's education by earmarking money that is to be spent on education alone. This plan works in much the same way as RRSPs, with a few fundamental differences. The first, is that money being put into the plan is not tax deductible, but withdrawals are tax free. Therefore, these are much the same as Roth IRA's in the United States. To encourage the use of RESPs as a means of saving for education, the government in Canada initiated a subsidy scheme called the Canada Education Savings Grant (CESGs). This program provides people with a grant of 2% a year on the money they place in the RESP, up to a maximum of $400.
While the use of RESPs has increased in recent years due to this initiative, the participation rates have been somewhat skewed. The problem is that those in the upper income brackets have had the greatest participation (see, e.g., Milligan, 2002) . Those that can afford to pay for their kids to go to school are the ones being subsidized. If the system was designed to help alleviate the burden of paying for higher education on all families, then it would appear to be a success for the wealthy. But, if it was designed to make education more attainable to the less well off, then it would seem that the program needs to be reevaluated.
In any event, the use of RESPs, with the help of CESGs, does indeed increase the incentives for investing in higher education (Collins and Davies, forthcoming) . Ignoring any sort of equity argument, results show that the program can indeed combat rising education costs. If costs continue to rise, an increase in the CESG, either in absolute terms (i.e. increasing the $400 limit) or in percentage terms (i.e. increase the 2% grant) would be a wise consideration.
It should be mentioned that families are also capable of withdrawing from their RRSPs to pay for education. The tax free withdrawal can be made to pay for the education of a child, but must be repaid within 10 years. If so, then no tax will be charged on the withdrawn funds. The benefit of using a RESP to pay for a child's education over an RRSP is clear; the CESG is only applicable to the RESP, not the RRSP. Even if the child chooses not to go to school, money put into the RESP is not lost, since it can be transferred to an RRSP, with the appropriate deductions made for the grant and any interest accumulating on the grant.
Previous studies have attempted to justify increases in tuition from that of potential earnings. The higher the potential earnings in certain disciplines, the higher the tuition. Likewise, if there are any capacity constraints, then these disciplines should also be considered for increases in tuition. If we ignore migration effects and substitutability, then fields with a limited number of spots will tend to realize an increase the overall rate of return to the discipline simply because labour market supply is now limited.
This argument for increasing tuition is a slippery slope. While proponents of deregulation in Ontario used capacity constraints, or something quite similar, in their arguments enrollment numbers continue to rise. The problem is a lack of incentives for universities to commit to the limited enrollment numbers. That is, there is a time consistency problem. The reason, is money.
If they commit to their limited enrollment number, in an attempt to keep class sizes down, universities forgo tuition revenues. Providing they have the space, universities would like to have as many students as possible in these programs to increase their revenues. This is what appears to be happening. Figure 1 shows a rise in enrollment numbers in computer science, engineering and business programs in Ontario, since deregulation. Table 2 shows that class sizes have also been getting larger in general. The funding cuts of the government may be driving universities to seek extra funding from deregulated fees, but the fact remains that one intention of deregulation was to limit class size and this appears to be taking a back seat to the possibility of increased revenues. Therefore, arguments based on capacity constraints, while theoretically sound, do not appear practical in the current market context. Finally, with increased costs to education, student loans have become increasingly important. Participation rates in student loan programs in Canada have been rising in recent years, as has the amount of student debt upon graduation. In the current education system, deregulation of tuition fees will only exacerbate these facts. Many people look at the rising participation rates and increased debt loads as a potential problem for graduates, but is this necessarily so?
Using the same methodology, Collins and Davies (forthcoming) compute ETRs of males and females with Ontario student loans and Canada student loans. They find that student loans decrease the disincentive effects created by the tax system to invest in a university education, while increasing rates of return. The reason is that student loans spread out the repayment period and, more important, are interest free while the student is in school. viii With the recent addition of interest repayment of student loans being made tax deductible, students are even better off. ix 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS We have gone beyond previous studies on university education in Canada, which simply look at rates of returns, to illustrate the impact that rising costs have on individuals from a taxation and expenditure perspective. While there is the inevitable reduction in rates of return, there is also the increase in effective tax rates and fall in effective subsidy rates, which lead to a reduction in incentives for Canadian students to invest in a university education. There is also the increased possibility that these students will look for work elsewhere after graduation to realize a higher payoff on their investment. This type of behavior is consistent with the brain drain phenomenon.
We have also shown that deregulation of tuition fees has caused previously high return fields to be surpassed by all other fields in this study, except for humanities degrees. While we concentrated on 4-year business degrees, the same conclusion would likely apply to other disciplines where tuition fees have been deregulated, e.g., engineering and computer science.
Unless these fields have a high earnings premium, that is earnings over and above the mean university student, then these students will find it worthwhile to pursue education in an alternative field. Results showed that the earnings premium would have to be approximately 32% for females and 18% for males (on average) for 4-year business degrees to be as profitable as they were prior to deregulation. The lack of a sufficient earnings premium also makes migration a more attractive option.
The use of effective tax and subsidy rates to measure the incentives for university students to invest in alternative fields of study has shed new light on policies surrounding
Canada's universities. With rising tuition fees for the average student, combined with deregulation in certain fields, many fear that Canadian universities are moving towards a system more like the United States. This has lead to a number of critiques about higher education in
Canada, but as we have shown, these arguments are sometimes without merit.
Critics claim that, as a result of the current system, students are taking out more and bigger loans in order to take part in higher education. While the participation and loan numbers have been increasing in recent years, studies have shown that this isn't necessarily a bad thing (see Collins and Davies, forthcoming) . Students, who are participating in student loan plans, tend to have higher rates of return and lower net ETRs. The reason for this result is primarily due to the interest free status enjoyed by students participating in student loan plans. The unfortunately reality is that if students are ineligible for student loans, which they may be as a result of their parents' income, then this result falls apart. Fortunately, research has shown that credit constraints do not appear to be as big a problem as previously thought (Cameron and Heckman, 1998) . Recently there has also been talk about revamping student loan plans in Canada. It would be interesting to see if proposed plans, like income contingent student loans, would yield similar or, perhaps, more favorable results.
Capacity constraints have also been argued as a reason for increasing tuition (Smith, 2002) . Proponents argue that spots in certain programs are best kept limited. Students get more individualized attention, due to smaller student teacher ratios, they feel less intimidated to ask questions, and are able to become acquainted with their fellow classmates more easily. If capacity constrained programs are to maintain the high quality that students have come to expect then increasing tuition is a necessary evil. But, as we have shown and as economic theory predicts there can be a commitment failure among these so called capacity constrained programs.
Once they are able to charge higher tuition fees, the lure of higher revenues from increasing enrollment numbers is often too great. In the end, they end up increasing their enrollment by offering larger classes, if possible, or more sections of the same class.
This study has attempted to show how the incentive effects of different fields of study are affected by the tax and expenditure systems in Canada. We have also attempted to explain the role of deregulation, by way of reference to top business schools, in a much more comprehensive manner then previously done, but more work is needed. It would be interesting to see the general equilibrium effects of policy changes. While this study has been able to capture more effects than its predecessors, much remains unanswered and which can only be answered with a general equilibrium model. The role of externalities in the different fields of study would also be interesting to explore. If "higher return" fields contribute more to things like economic growth, do we really want to make these students pay exorbitant amounts of tuition making migration to Western is the most expensive of the three schools in our study, with tuition and additional fees and expenses totaling $54,900. Queen's is second with $41,243 and Toronto third with $41,088. Note the drastic change in either the second or third year of study. This is when the student officially becomes a member of the business school. The first year tuition values (and in Western's case the second year also) are the ones faced by the majority of undergraduates.
When they become members of the business school, rates jump remarkably. ii The problems faced when dealing with human capital are quite different than in the study of physical capital. For example, in calculating EMTR's for physical capital one must specify a scenario concerning the determination of market rates of return. It might be assumed, for example, that Canada is a small player in a perfectly competitive world capital market. In order to pay the world interest rate, a corporation would have to earn a gross rate of return on a debt-financed project sufficient to pay both tax and interest at the world rate. By observing market rates and tax parameters one can infer the before-tax rate of return on a marginal investment. The after-tax return is then found by deducting all taxes. As we shall see, the procedure for human capital is quite different.
Field of Study Description
iii For a description of how this is done, the reader is directed to Vaillancourt and Bourdeau-Primeau (2002) .
iv For regression results and tuition values, the reader is directed to Vaillancourt and Bourdeau-Primeau (2002) .
v An alternative is to define the ETR as the ratio of the present value of net taxes on labour income over the lifetime to the present value of lifetime earnings (see Mintz, 2001) . While the two approaches will often produce similar results, this is not always the case. We prefer the approach followed here in part because it does not require any assumption to be made about individuals' discount rates. vi We will see that this is not the case when we consider deregulated tuition values.
vii This is not to say that engineering is without external benefits. According to endogenous growth literature, or at least one strand of it, emphasis is placed on the spillover effects of human capital, technology adoption, etc. Often the percentage of engineers in a country's population is one of the most important determinants of the rate of technological adoption.
viii The student must maintain full time status.
ix Collins and Davies (2002) found the effect of this to be rather small, but nonetheless positive.
